Lord, grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, to change those that I can and the wisdom to know their difference.

Lord, in this time of uncertainty, I offer everything to you. Direct me to the path where you want me to be. Provide me with enough strength and courage.

In you Lord, I trust and believe.

Thought of the Day:

We arrive precisely where we need to arrive because the hand of God always guides those who follow their path with faith.

PETRON CORPORATION v. MAYOR TOBIAS M. TIANGCO and
MUNICIPAL TREASURER MANUEL T. ENRIQUEZ of the
MUNIPALITY OF NAVOTAS, METRO MANILA

G.R. 158881, 16 April 2006, Second Division, (Tinga, J.)

While local government units are authorized to burden all such other class of goods with “taxes, fees and charges,” excepting excise taxes, a specific prohibition is imposed barring the levying of any other type of taxes with respect to petroleum products.

In accordance to the New Navotas Revenue Code or Ordinance 92-03, petitioner Petron Corporation was assessed a total tax of P6,259,087.62. Petron filed a letter protest arguing that it is exempt from paying local business taxes as provided by Article 232 (h) of the Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code.

The letter-protest was denied. A Complaint for Cancellation of Assessment was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon. The RTC dismissed the Complaint and required Petron to pay the assessed tax. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but it was later denied by the court. Hence, the filing of this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a local government unit is empowered under the Local Government Code (LGC) to impose business taxes on persons or entities engaged in the sale of petroleum

HELD:

Petition GRANTED.

Section 133(h) of the LGC reads as follows:

Sec. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. - Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and Barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:

xxx

(h) Excise taxes on articles enumerated under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products;

Evidently, Section 133 prescribes the limitations on the capacity of local government units to exercise their taxing powers otherwise granted to them under the LGC. Apparently, paragraph (h) of the Section mentions two kinds of taxes which cannot be imposed by local government units, namely: “excise taxes on articles enumerated under the National Internal Revenue Code [(NIRC)], as amended;” and “taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products.”

The power of a municipality to impose business taxes is provided for in Section 143 of the LGC. Under the provision, a municipality is authorized to impose business taxes on a whole host of business activities. Suffice it to say, unless there is another provision of law which states otherwise, Section 143, broad in scope as it is, would undoubtedly cover the business of selling diesel fuels, or any other petroleum product for that matter.

Section 133(h) provides two kinds of taxes which cannot be imposed by local government units: “excise taxes on articles enumerated” under the NIRC, as amended; and “taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products.” There is no doubt that among the excise taxes on articles enumerated under the NIRC are those levied on petroleum products, per Section 148 of the NIRC.

The power of a municipality to impose business taxes derives from Section 143 of the Code that specifically enumerates several types of business on which it may impose taxes, including manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors, dealers of any article of commerce of whatever nature; those engaged in the export or commerce of essential commodities; retailers; contractors and other independent contractors; banks and financial institutions; and peddlers engaged in the sale of any merchandise or article of commerce. This obviously broad power is further supplemented by paragraph (h) of Section 143 which authorizes the sanggunian to impose taxes on any other businesses not otherwise specified under Section 143 which the sanggunian concerned may deem proper to tax.

This ability of local government units to impose business or other local taxes is ultimately rooted in the 1987 Constitution. Section 5, Article X assures that “[e]ach local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges,” though the power is “subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide.” There is no doubt that following the 1987 Constitution and the Code, the fiscal autonomy of local government units has received greater affirmation than ever. Previous decisions that have been skeptical of the viability, if not the wisdom of reposing fiscal autonomy to local government units have fallen by the wayside.

Section 5(a) of the Code states that “[a]ny provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit.” But somewhat conversely, Section 5(b) then proceeds to assert that “[i]n case of doubt, any tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be construed strictly against the local government unit enacting it, and liberally in favor of the taxpayer.” And this latter qualification has to be respected as a constitutionally authorized limitation which Congress has seen fit to provide. Evidently, local fiscal autonomy should not necessarily translate into abject deference to the power of local government units to impose taxes.

Section 133(h) states that local government units “shall not extend to the levy of xxx taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products.” Respondents assert that the phrase “taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products” pertains to the imposition of direct or excise taxes on petroleum products, and not business taxes. If the phrase actually pertains to excise taxes, then it would be an exercise in utter redundancy, since the preceding phrase already prohibits the imposition of excise taxes on articles already subject to such taxes under the NIRC, such as petroleum products. There would be no sense on the part of the legislature to twice emphasize in the same sentence that excise taxes on petroleum products are beyond the pale of local government taxation.

The Court concedes that a tax on a business is distinct from a tax on the article itself, or for that matter, that a business tax is distinct from an excise tax. However, such distinction is immaterial insofar as the latter part of Section 133(h) is concerned, for the phrase “taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products” does not qualify the kind of taxes, fees or charges that could withstand the absolute prohibition imposed by the provision. It would have been a different matter had Congress, in crafting Section 133(h), barred “excise taxes” or “direct taxes,” or any category of taxes only, for then it would be understood that only such specified taxes on petroleum products could not be imposed under the prohibition. The absence of such a qualification leads to the conclusion that all sorts of taxes on petroleum products, including business taxes, are prohibited by Section 133(h). Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.

The language of Section 133(h) makes plain that the prohibition with respect to petroleum products extends not only to excise taxes thereon, but all “taxes, fees and charges.” The earlier reference in paragraph (h) to excise taxes comprehends a wider range of subjects of taxation: all articles already covered by excise taxation under the NIRC, such as alcohol products, tobacco products, mineral products, automobiles, and such non-essential goods as jewelry, goods made of precious metals, perfumes, and yachts and other vessels intended for pleasure or sports. In contrast, the later reference to “taxes, fees and charges” pertains only to one class of articles of the many subjects of excise taxes, specifically, “petroleum products”. While local government units are authorized to burden all such other class of goods with “taxes, fees and charges,” excepting excise taxes, a specific prohibition is imposed barring the levying of any other type of taxes with respect to petroleum products.

LOLITA EUGENIO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 168163, 26 March 2008, First Division, (Corona, J.)

The irregularities attending Eugenio’s arrest and custodial investigation, assuming they did take place, do not work to nullify her conviction as the Supreme Court is neither the proper forum, nor this appeal the correct remedy, to raise this issue. Any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused, depriving the trial court of jurisdiction over her person, should be raised in a motion to quash at any time before entering her plea. Petitioner’s failure to timely raise this objection amounted to a waiver of such irregularity and resulted in her concomitant submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction over her person.

Petitioner Lolita Eugenio is a commissioned agent of respondent Alfredo Mangali in his check re-discounting and lending business. Eugenio persuaded Mangali to extend loans to various individuals. Two parcels of land, covered by TCT No. 171602 and TCT No. 92585, were offered as securities for the loans. Mangali thereafter extended loans with a condition that the borrowers shall execute Deed of Sale.

The loans lapsed and remained unpaid. Mangali inquired from the Register of Deeds the status of TCT Nos. 171602 and 92585. He found out that TCT No. 171602 had been cancelled in 1995 while TCT No. 92585 is not registered with the Register of Deeds. Mangali sought the help of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and an entrapment operation was conducted. A Complaint for Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents was filed against Eugenio. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Eugenio of one count of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, the filing of this petition. Eugenio avers that the prosecution failed to prove that their was conspiracy between her and the borrowers to defraud Mangali. She further avers that the entrapment operation was illegal due to some irregularities which attended her arrest.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the irregularities of the entrapment operation may nullify Eugenio’s conviction
2. Whether or not the prosecution proved the existence of conspiracy

HELD:

Petition GRANTED.

On the alleged irregularities attending Eugenio’s arrest and custodial investigation

Petitioner contends that her arrest following the NBI entrapment operation was illegal because it was “conducted by a division of the NBI which does not deal with estafa or fraud” and without the participation of the police. Petitioner also alleges that after she was arrested, she was neither informed of her constitutional right to counsel nor afforded her right to a phone call. Petitioner concludes that these irregularities tainted the NBI’s entrapment operation, rendering the same without any “probative value in determining whether or not a criminal act has been committed.”

Respondent does not contest petitioner’s claim on the alleged irregularities which attended her arrest. Nevertheless, such irregularities, assuming they did take place, do not work to nullify petitioner’s conviction as this Court is neither the proper forum, nor this appeal the correct remedy, to raise this issue. Any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused, depriving the trial court of jurisdiction over her person, should be raised in a motion to quash at any time before entering her plea. Petitioner’s failure to timely raise this objection amounted to a waiver of such irregularity and resulted in her concomitant submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction over her person. Indeed, not only did petitioner submit to such jurisdiction, she actively invoked it through her participation during the trial. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim the contrary.

As for the failure of the NBI agents to inform petitioner of her right to counsel during custodial investigation, this right attains significance only if the person under investigation makes a confession in writing without aid of counsel which is then sought to be admitted against the accused during the trial. In such case, the tainted confession obtained in violation of Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution is inadmissible in evidence against the accused.

The prosecution failed to prove conspiracy to render petitioner liable as principal to Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents

Under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, Falsification is committed under any of the following modes:

(1) Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
(2) Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
(3) Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;
(4) Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
(5) Altering true dates;
(6) Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;
(7) Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or
(8) Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry or official book.

The trial court found petitioner guilty of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents (which the Court of Appeals sustained) for petitioner’s “principal role” in the loan transactions between Mangali, on the one hand, and Saquitan and Ty, on the other hand. In further pinning liability on petitioner for her role in the alleged falsification of TCT No. 92585, the trial court, for lack of proof of petitioner’s participation in falsifying such document, relied on the disputable legal presumption that the possessor of a falsified document who makes use of such to her advantage is presumed to be the author of the falsification. In short, petitioner’s conviction below rested on an implied conspiracy with her co-accused to swindle Mangali, buttressed, as to one count, by a reliance on a disputable presumption of culpability.

We reverse.

True, conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence as the same can be inferred from the concerted acts of the accused. However, this does not dispense with the requirement that conspiracy, like the felony itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the presence of a reasonable doubt as to the existence of conspiracy suffices to negate not only the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense as principal but also, in the absence of proof implicating the accused as accessory or accomplice, the criminal liability of the accused.

Taking into account admitted facts and unrebutted claims, her participation in the events leading to her arrest is cast in an entirely new light raising reasonable doubt as to her culpability. These facts and unrefuted claims are: (1) petitioner works for Mangali, on commission basis, in the latter’s check re-discounting and lending businesses and (2) the Civil Register of Manila certified as true copy the photocopy of TCT No. 171602 that Saquitan gave petitioner.

As Mangali’s agent, petitioner is obliged to bring prospective borrowers to Mangali; otherwise, she will not earn commissions. This also explains why she was present in all the occasions Mangali met Saquitan and Ty – she was pecuniarily interested in seeing to it that the deals she brokered were consummated to enable her to receive commission from Mangali.

On petitioner’s disclosure to Mangali that TCT No. 171602 is registered with the Register of Deeds of Manila, petitioner merely relied on the certification by the Register of Deeds of Manila that the photocopy of TCT No. 171602 she brought with her was a true copy of the title on file in that office. The prosecution did not rebut this.

In sum, we hold that the lower courts’ rulings are based on a misapprehension of facts justifying reversal on review. Indeed, when, as here, the circumstances surrounding the alleged commission of crimes are capable of two inferences, one favoring the innocence of the accused and the other her guilt, the inference for her innocence must prevail, consistent with the Constitutional presumption of her innocence.

PNB-REPUBLIC BANK v. SPOUSES JOSE and SALVACION CORDOVA

G.R. No. 169314, 14 March 2008, Third Division, (Nachura, J.)

An essential and logical implication of Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court is that the filing of a second notice of appeal from the modified decision is a superfluity, if not a useless ceremony. It, therefore, matters no longer whether that second notice is timely filed or not.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila rendered its decision dismissing the Complaint filed by Petitioner PNB-Republic Bank for the rescission of its Contract of Lease with Respondents Spouses Jose and Salvacion Cordova. The Court, however, granted the counterclaim of Spouses Cordova.

Unsatisfied with the decision, PNB timely filed its first notice of appeal while Spouses Cordova filed their Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC modified its decision and increased the amount of damages awarded to Spouses Cordova. A copy of the modified decision was received by PNB on August 07, 2002 and on August 22, 2002, PNB filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC denied the Motion on September 30 and a copy of the said order was received by PNB on October 14, 2002. PNB filed its second notice of appeal on October 23, 2002, which was later dismissed by the court.

PNB re-filed its appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA). Spouses Cordova aver that the appeal should be dismissed on the ground that petitioner failed to file its appeal on time. The appellate court dismissed the petition. It held that the first notice of appeal of PNB is invalid and ineffective due to the modified decision of the RTC. It further ruled that the second notice of appeal was not perfected on time.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the case and in declaring that the first notice of appeal is ineffective and invalid while the second appeal was not perfected on time

HELD:

Petition GRANTED.

Petitioner’s appeal is deemed perfected “as to [it]” when it timely filed its first notice of appeal, following Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Incidentally, this perfected appeal is not docketed with the CA, because the trial court, which was still to resolve respondents’ motion for reconsideration, had not yet transmitted the records of the case to the appellate court. Incumbent, nonetheless, on the part of the RTC is the elevation of the records after a resolution of the merits of respondents’ motion.

Its appeal having been perfected, petitioner did not need to file a second notice of appeal even if the trial court granted, as it did, the other party’s motion for reconsideration and modified the decision to increase the monetary award.

An essential and logical implication of the said rule is that the filing of a second notice of appeal from the modified decision is a superfluity, if not a useless ceremony. It, therefore, matters no longer whether that second notice is timely filed or not. Hence, in this case, petitioner’s filing of a belated second notice of appeal does not affect or foreclose its already perfected appeal.

JUANITO CHAN v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE et. al.

G.R. No. 147065, 14 March 2008, Third Division, (Nachura, J.)

In Crespo, the Court laid down the rule that once an Information is filed in court, any disposition of the case rests on the sound discretion of the court. In subsequent cases, the Court clarified that Crespo does not bar the Justice Secretary from reviewing the findings of the investigating prosecutor in the exercise of his power of control over his subordinates. The Justice Secretary is merely advised, as far as practicable, to refrain from entertaining a petition for review of the prosecutor’s finding when the Information is already filed in court. In other words, the power or authority of the Justice Secretary to review the prosecutor’s findings subsists even after the Information is filed in court. The court, however, is not bound by the Resolution of the Justice Secretary, but must evaluate it before proceeding with the trial. While the ruling of the Justice Secretary is persuasive, it is not binding on courts.

An Information for illegal selling of prohibited drugs was filed against Petitioner Juanito Chan before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. Chan, on the other hand, filed a Petition for Review with the Secretary of Justice. The petition was dismissed on the ground that there is no reversible error on the findings of the State Prosecutor. A Petition for Certiorari was thereafter filed before the Court of Appeals (CA). The appellate court dismissed the petition in accordance with the doctrine laid down in Crespo v. Mogul which provides that once a case or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case rests on the discretion of the court. It further ruled that a Petition for Certiorari cannot be availed for Chan has other existing remedies such as a Motion to Quash or Dismiss.

A Petition for Certiorari was then filed with the Supreme Court. Chan contends that the case of Crespo has already been superseded by Allado v. Diokno. He further contends that a Petition for Certiorari was his speedy and most adequate remedy.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in applying the doctrine laid down in Crespo v. Mogul
2. Whether or not a Petition for Certiorari can be availed despite the existence of other remedies

HELD:

Petition DISMISSED.

The case of Crespo still subsists

Contrary to petitioner’s view, Crespo subsists and was not superseded by Allado.

Allado, which was punctuated by inordinate eagerness in the gathering of evidence and in the preliminary investigation, serves as an exception and may not be invoked unless similar circumstances are clearly shown to exist. No such circumstances were established in the present case.

In Crespo, the Court laid down the rule that once an Information is filed in court, any disposition of the case rests on the sound discretion of the court. In subsequent cases, the Court clarified that Crespo does not bar the Justice Secretary from reviewing the findings of the investigating prosecutor in the exercise of his power of control over his subordinates. The Justice Secretary is merely advised, as far as practicable, to refrain from entertaining a petition for review of the prosecutor’s finding when the Information is already filed in court. In other words, the power or authority of the Justice Secretary to review the prosecutor’s findings subsists even after the Information is filed in court. The court, however, is not bound by the Resolution of the Justice Secretary, but must evaluate it before proceeding with the trial. While the ruling of the Justice Secretary is persuasive, it is not binding on courts.

Albeit the findings of the Justice Secretary are not absolute and are subject to judicial review, the Court generally adheres to the policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, particularly when the said findings are well-supported by the facts as established by the evidence on record. Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the prosecutor or any other officer authorized to conduct preliminary investigation, courts as a rule must defer to said officer’s finding and determination of probable cause, since the determination of the existence of probable cause is the function of the prosecutor. Simply stated, findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review, unless made with grave abuse of discretion.

In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the CA primarily anchored its decision on Crespo, ratiocinating that it is without authority to restrain the lower court from proceeding with the case since the latter had already assumed jurisdiction.

A Petition for Certiorari may still be availed of even if there is available remedy

The CA, likewise, opined that the filing of the petition for certiorari was improper since petitioner still had an available remedy, that is, to file a motion to dismiss or to quash the Information with the trial court. We do not agree. A petition for certiorari may still be availed of even if there is an available remedy, when such remedy does not appear to be plain, speedy, and adequate in the ordinary course of law.

AMOS P. FRANCIA JR., et. al. v. MUNICIPALITY OF MERCAUAYAN

G.R. No. 170432, 24 March 2008, First Division, (Corona, J.)

Before a local government unit may enter into the possession of the property sought to be expropriated, it must (1) file a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance in the proper court and (2) deposit with the said court at least 15% of the property's fair market value based on its current tax declaration. The law does not make the determination of a public purpose a condition precedent to the issuance of a writ of possession.

A Complaint for expropriation was filed by respondent Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan against the property of petitioners Amos Francia, Cecilia Francia and Benjamin Francia. The Municipality of Meycauayan seeks to use the said property in order to establish a common public terminal for all public utility vehicles. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled that the expropriation was for public purpose and issued an Order of Expropriation.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals partially granted the petition. It nullified the Order of Expropriation except with regard to the writ of possession. It upheld the decision of the RTC that in issuance of writ of possession, prior determination of the existence of public purpose is necessary.

ISSUE:

Whether or not prior determination of existence of public purpose is necessary before the issuance of writ of possession

HELD:

Petition denied.

Section 19 of Republic Act 7160 provides:

Section 19. Eminent Domain. ― A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws; Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and that such offer was not accepted; Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated; Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.

Before a local government unit may enter into the possession of the property sought to be expropriated, it must (1) file a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance in the proper court and (2) deposit with the said court at least 15% of the property's fair market value based on its current tax declaration. The law does not make the determination of a public purpose a condition precedent to the issuance of a writ of possession.

JANTRIZ LIM

By the way, we have a new member. Her name is Jantriz Lim. I want to thank her for accepting our invitation and for committing herself to all the activities of the parish and organization.

WELCOME to COMI! We are looking forward to work with you in spreading the Kingdom of God!

meeting

I met my COMI members this afternoon and I discussed to them our Mission-Vision, Objectives and Rules and Regulations. My heart is filled with gladness because I am seeing concrete changes within our organization. My members are all dedicated to help me bring back the glory of COMI.


During the meeting, I reiterated to my members that our organization should not be a venue for competition. Rather, it should be a venue for unity and cooperation. I want my members to treat each other as brothers and sisters.


Our last activity was the sharing of our AHA Experience. Through that activity, I was able to know more about my members. I am saddened to know the present situation of some of them. They are having financial difficulty and they might stop studying. While hearing their stories, I realized that I am so blessed for my parents can provide me with anything and everything I want.

In silence, I join them in their prayers. I know God will help them surpass all the problems and difficulties that they are facing. God is good, all the time.